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State Preemption of Cable Television
Regulation .- Whatever Happened
to the Sanctity of Contract?

William M. Marticorena*
Lynda E. Marticorena**

California Governmeit Code section 53066.1 as recently amended gives
cable television operatorsthe right to obtain rate increaseseven in the face
of the city or county franchisor opposition. Since most cable franchise
agreements allow the franchisorto control ratesfor the cable service, there
is a conflict between the statute and the franchise contracts. This article
examines the issue of whether the statute violates the constitutionalprovisions against the impairment of contracts and whether the franchisor or a
subscriberof the service has the necessary standing to assert the constitutional argument.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Cable operators have always viewed municipal rate regulations
as a tragedy equal in degree only to the Great Flood. Even
though the Federal Communication Commission has, for a
number of years, preempted the local regulation of premium or
pay cable television' rates, 2 cable operators have viewed municiBA Loyola University of Los Angeles, 1974; J.D., Harvard University, 1977.
Member of the firm of Rutan & Tucker, Costa Mesa, California.
** BA California State University at Fullerton, 1976; J.D., Western State University College of Law, Fullerton, California, 1980. Associate, Curtis and Vaccard,
Newport Beach.
1. "Pay cable television" is the system in which the cable company produces

pal authority to regulate basic service rates as both unnecessary
and counter-productive. 3 Claiming that local governments having
acquired the contractual power to regulate rates are often illequipped to exercise it, and more often than not abuse their authority, cable operators throughout this country implored their
legislators for some form of statutory rate relief in the absence of
federal preemption over basic services. 4 At least in California,
these cries fell upon receptive ears.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The history of state preemption of cable television regulation in
California began with the introduction of Senate Bill 1757 (S.B.
1757) in 1978.5 This bill, as ultimately passed by the California
Legislature but vetoed by the Governor,6 required a local government body to, upon receipt of any request for rate changes, schedule within thirty days a public hearing on the matter, and to
consummate a final action upon the proposed rate increase within
120 days of the receipt thereof. If final action was not taken
within the 120-day period, the proposed rate changes became effective by operation of law. If the local government entity disapproved the rate changes, it was required to set forth in writing its
reasons for the denial, including, if applicable, a specific delineation of the information which was claimed to be lacking in the
rate increase application. In addition, in one of the most controand transmits their own shows rather than just transmitting shows from other stations. The companies also allow the local private production of shows to be transmitted over their cable system through leased access channels. The programs
involve an extra charge to the customer as they are not normally a part of a basic
cable television package. See Brookhaven Cable T.V. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216,
1218-19 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
2. Brookhaven Cable T.V. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (N.D.N.Y. 1979),
affid, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979) (court held Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had preempted area of pay cable television and struck down New York rate regulatory system). Cf.United States v.
Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (affirming FCC's jurisdiction in the area).
3. It should be noted that until 1976, the Rules and Regulations of the FCC
required some form of local rate regulation as a condition for the issuance of the
Certificate of Compliance, a procedure since abandoned. (47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (a) (4),
deleted by 41 Fed. Reg. 34963, 34968 (1976)).
4. The FCC has never, in any formal document, definedthe term ,basic service" for the purposes of federal rate preemption. In most cases, the definition of
this term is left to an interpretation of the franchise agreement. By broadly defining this term in the franchise contract, the local government entity can expand the
purview of its rate regulation authority. The FCC allows the local regulation of
rates for basic services. Cable Television Report and Order, Docket Nos. 18397 et
al. 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 209 (Feb. 3, 1972).
5. S.B. 1757, 1978-79 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979).
6. The bill was passed in August of 1978 by both the Senate and Assembly.
Governor Brown vetoed the bill on September 30, 1978. California Senate Final
History 1977-1978 954.
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versial portions of the bill, the franchisee was specifically authorized to bring actions based upon breach of contract and inverse
condemnation to challenge the denial of the rate increase. The
extension of this contractual remedy to an aggrieved cable operator was clearly a change in existing law and reversed California
precedent that a grant or denial of a rate increase constitutes a
legislative act challengeable only by the ordinary mandamus remedies. 7 Although some cable operators have maintained for years
that the denial of a rate increase can predicate a cause of action
for breach of contract, no California court has accepted this
theory.8
Quickly recovering from the trauma of Governor Brown's veto
of SB 1757, the cable industry, this time through Assemblyman
7. Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59
Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976) This case involved a challenge by cable
company to a denial of a rate increase by a city council. The court held that a
cable franchise was not a public utility. Accordingly, inverse condemnation was
not permitted as a cause of action. The cable company also failed their burden of
proof to show lack of good faith.
8. It has been argued by several cable operators, without success, that the
denial of a rate increase by a municipality can constitute a breach of contract even
where the cable television franchise does not expressly provide for any contractual right to rate increases. The premise of the argument is that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the municipality to approve all
requested rate increases if they are reasonable. Further, the argument suggests
that the burden falls on the municipality to show the unreasonableness of the requested rate increase. The fallacy in the argument lies in the fact that the grant or
denial of a rate increase, at least in California, constitutes a legislative act judged
solely by the criteria of Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. See Orange County
Cable Communications Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 CaL
Rptr. 429 (1976). Under Agins v. City of Tiberon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372 (1979) (challenge to zoning restrictions as inverse condemnation), the
exclusive remedy of one attacking a legislative action is mandamus, as opposed to
an action for monetary damages. Thus, absent an express duty in the contract to
approve requested rate changes, which would transform a legislative action into a
ministerial or executive one, a cable operator cannot sue a local governmental entity for monetary damages because of a denial of requested rate changes under
either the theory of breach of contract or inverse condemnation.
An application of the "government/proprietary" dichotomy does not disturb this
result. Regardless of the character of these regulatory actions, be they "legislative" or "proprietary," the exclusive remedy is mandamus. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers, a court should not, and cannot, look behind the
legislative body's actions, but must judge the actions pursuant to the standards
contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 or 1094.5. It should also be noted
that the characterization of a legislative body's action as "proprietary" does not
necessarily deny the legislative nature of the action. Therefore, even a wholesale
acceptance of the "governmental/proprietary" dichotomy does not lend any support to the breach of contract theory.

Bruce Young, paraded Assembly Bill 6999 (AB 699) in front of the
weary eyes of the California Legislature. Though not as vigorously opposed by California municipalities as SB 1757, this Bill
certainly did not receive the praise of local government. Despite
this fact, AB 699 was passed in 1979 and codified at Government
Code section 53066.1. This bill unilaterally amended existing
franchise agreements between cable operators and local government entities to allow the cable operator the option of rate deregulation or rate adjustment if they comply with the statutory
conditions.
Government Code section 53066.1 (section 53066.1) allows a
cable television system to deregulate its basic service if (1) it provides twenty or more channels to the cable television subscriber,
(2) it receives or has contracted to receive satellite television signals by an earth receiving station, (3) it has a subscriber penetration ratio of less than seventy percent of the franchise area, (4) it
is located in a county or a portion of a county having three significantly viewed stations or two significantly viewed stations and an
educational station, and (5) it participates in a community channel service program as defined by the statute.1 0 If a cable television system meets all of the criteria stated above, but possesses a
penetration ratio in excess of seventy percent, it is entitled to
"rate adjustment" as opposed to "rate regulation."" Under the
terms of the statute, a rate adjusting system may increase its
rates no more than seventy-five percent of increases in the Consumer Price Index, except when that system rebuilds from twelve
to twenty or more channels, in which case it may increase its
rates to the state-wide average for those cable television systems
providing twenty or more channels.12 The statute provides an exception to the conditions of rate deregulation or adjustment for
those systems with under 35,000 subscribers in communities of
under 20,000 people. "Small systems" may increase their rates up
to seventy-five percent of the Consumer Price Index upon the
provision of twelve or more channels, including a community
channel service program13 as defined in the statute.14 Although
9. See infra notes 10-19 and accompanying text for a description of the contents of the statute.
10. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 53066.1(a) (West Supp. 1982).
11. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066.1(b) (West Supp. 1982).
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. A community service channel exists if all the following are met:
(1) one channel is dedicated for local community, public access, education and
government access purposes. More than one channel may be required for systems
with over 24 channels;
(2) participates in a statewide program that provides instruction and guidelines
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not required to meet the other conditions for rate deregulation or
adjustment, small systems must be located in a county or portions of a county having three significantly viewed stations or two
15
significantly viewed stations and an educational station.
In order to provide a community service channel program
within the meaning of the statute, the cable operator is required
to dedicate at least one equivalent channel for these purposes if
the system's channel capacity is between twelve and twenty

channels, one regular channel and one equivalent channel if the
channel capacity is between twenty-one and twenty-four channels, two regular channels if channel capacity falls between
twenty-five and thirty channels, and three regular channels if the
system possesses more than thirty channels of programming.
The additional channels need only be provided upon the fulfillment of a utilization formula.16 In addition, the cable operator
must provide certain funding and equipment dedications to state
and local public access programs.17 The remainder of the statute
defines, in somewhat confusing terms, the other conditions for
rate deregulation or adjustment18 and expressly provides that the
for use of the channel as well as creating a foundation of independent persons to
promote and encourage the use of the channel;
(3) pays 50 cents to the foundation for each subscriber;
(4) provides technical advice and facilities to the local users;
(5) cooperates in educational courses on the use of the channels;
(6) provides free tape playback facilities;
(7) informs the public of available access to the system;
(8) consults with the franchisor about the use of the channel;
(9) provides government and educational access to ground receiving facilities;
and
(10) provides information on availablity of system and system management.
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 53066.1(d) (West Supp. 1982).
15. CAL. Gov'r CODE § 53066.1(b) (West Supp. 1982).
16. Id.
17. See supra note 14.
18. There are numerous items in the statute which are not defined. For example, the statute does not indicate whether the channel requirement relates to the
provision of actual channels of programming, or merely refers to the "capacity" to
deliver a certain number of video channels irrespective of the programming actually carried. In addition, the statute never specifies the nature of the "Declaration" which must be ified with the local entity prior to rate deregulation or
adjustment and whether the document must comply with the procedural requirement of Civil Procedure Code section 2015.5. Both of these statutory omissions,
among others, have led to litigation. See, e.g., City of San Luis Obispo v. Sonic
Cable T.V., Inc. (County of San Luis Obispo-Case No. 55408) 1982; City of Pittsburgh v. Viacom International, (Contra Costa County - Case Nos. 230-568 231-497),
1982.

statute will expire on January 1, 1984 unless extended. 19
In 1982, the California Legislature clarified, extended, and modified Government Code section 53066.1 and added Government
Code section 53066.2 through Assembly Bill 3685.20 In extremely
confusing and disjointed language, this statute goes far beyond
the limitations on municipal rate control contained in section
53066.1 and declares complete state preemption of cable television
rate regulation and preempts any form of municipal control inconsistent with statutory directives. 21 The statute, then, in extremely
pro-industry language, resolves many of the ambiguities contained in AB 699.22 The statute delineates a procedure for judging
factual compliance with the conditions of rate deregulation or adjustment, and imposes a strict statute of limitations upon the mu23
nicipality in contesting a cable operator's deregulation election.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statute expressly recognizes the ability of local government entities to regulate in areas outside of rate control subject to proper limits of the police
power, but seems to impose a contractual standard of review
upon local regulatory action,24 as opposed to the legislative standard.25 Finally, in a stroke of legislative creativity and fiction, the
statute expressly and specifically bars both a local government
entity and a cable operator from raising the defense of impairment of contract in any case "where the due and proper exercise
of police power, or the limits thereof, is at issue.
...
26 Section
53066.1 as expanded by AB 3685 has effectively stripped local government of its ability to regulate basic service rates.
The authority to regulate cable television rates was, in most
cases, granted to the municipality through the franchise agreement between the municipality and the cable operator. In most
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066.1(c) (2) (West Supp. 1982).
20. AB 3685, 1982 Statutes, Chapter 679.
21. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53066.1(q) (West Supp. 1982) which provides:
This section as amended by the Statutes of 1982, shall establish the state's
preemption, under the terms and conditions prescribed herein, of the control and regulation of cable television subscriber rates, charges, and rate
structure heretofore or hereinafter established by any franchisor pursuant
to section 53066, to the extent that such control or regulation is inconsistent with this section.
1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 53066.1(q) (West Supp.).
22. For example, AB 3685 expressly defines the channel requirement in terms
of "capacity" as opposed to programming. See 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv.
§ 53066.1(m) (3) (West Supp.). The "declaration" requirement is, however, given a
surprisingly strict interpretation in that the document must comply with the directives of Code of Civil Procedure § 2015.5. 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 53066.1(d) (West

Supp.).
23. 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 53066.1(g) (West Supp.).

24. 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. § 53066.1(p) (West Supp.).
25. See supra note 8.
26. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53 066 .1(p) (West Supp. 1982).
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cases, those contractual franchise agreements, knowingly and intelligently entered into by both the municipality and the cable operator, contained express language sanctioning municipal rate
control for the period of the franchise. Despite the sanctity of
contract in American society, the California Legislature has felt
justified in paying no heed to the reasonable expectation of the
parties to the contract and trampled upon the municipality's contractual rights without hesitation. Does a franchise agreement between a local government and its cable operator bear any
deference under the law, or can the state freely and with immunity discard the vested contractual protections and ultimately relegate the right of a local government and its citizens to an inferior
status?
The problem of state interference with local regulation of cable
television is not limited to California. Although few states have
adopted comprehensive state regulatory statutes, many have introduced bills which affect cable programming. For example, in
1979, over 135 bills were introduced in state legislatures throughout the country which affected cable television, and, of these,
thirty-six bills proposed some form of state regulation. 27 Of these
thirty-six bills, several, which were ultimately adopted, provide
for some form of state deregulation. 28 A few states have adopted
legislation which has declared cable television to be a public utility completely under the purview of state control.29 In 1982, the
27. National Cable Television Association, Interaction, 5 (July 1980). For example, Alaska passed a rate deregulation bill in 1980 which deregulated twelve of
the state's fourteen systems. Massachusetts recently issued an order which suspended rate regulation in 75% of the state's system. Florida passed a rate deregulation bill last year which tied rate increases to the Consumer Price Index. That
bill was ultimately vetoed by the Governor. 21 URBAN L REV. 179, 221-21 n.237

(1981).
28. Id.
29. The district court in Nevada upheld a state statute that granted the Nevada Public Service Commission authority over cable operations. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision. T.V. Pix, Inc., v. Taylor, 304 F.
Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd per-curiam, 396 U.S. 556 (1970). Statutes confer the
power to regulate public utilities in most states. States that regulate cable television pursuant to these statutes define cable as a public utility. See, e.g., White v.
Ann Arbor, 406 Mich. 554, 281 N.W.2d 283 (1979). The Michigan Subdivision Control Act of 1967 defined a public utility as: "all persons, firms, corporations, copartnerships, or municipal or other public authority providing gas, electricity, water,
steam, telephone, sewer or other services of a similar nature." MxcH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 560.102(1) (1980). The Michigan court held that the state had authority over
cable television because it was similar to television service and thus a public utility under the Act. White v. Ann. Arbor, 406 Mich. at 554, 281 N.W.2d at 289. One

California Legislature considered and rejected such a statute.30
The recent trend of state intervention in cable television regulation should be alarming to both local government entities and
subscribers. State regulatory legislation,. as well as other forms of
state preemption, denies the municipality important regulatory
rights under the franchise contract. Although many assume that
wholesale state intrusion into municipal regulation of cable is
permissible, such a conclusion is far from clear. The purpose of
this article is to examine the relationship among the municipality,
the cable operator, and the state, to determine whether any limitations exist upon the state's ability to impair the rights of a local
government under a franchise agreement. Although the analysis
herein will center upon the viability of California Government
Code section 53066.1, since it constitutes one of the first statutes
of its type in the country, the conclusions derived from analysis of
that statute, and its interplay with the impairment clauses of the
United States 3' and California Constitutions, 32 will obviously be
relevant in judging the validity of any form of state preemption of
cable television regulation.

ll.

CALIFORNIA MUNICIPALITIES POSSESS THE CONSTITUTIONAL,
STATUTORY, AND CONTRACTUAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE CABLE TELEVISION RATES

Municipalities in California possess the direct constitutional authority to franchise and regulate cable television systems which

utilize public streets and highways, and to prescribe rules and
judge went further. "[slince cable television is truly a public utility, state wide
regulation would certainly enhance the likelihood that the benefits of cable television would adhere to all the public." 406 Mich. at 558, 281 N.W.2d at 291 (Moody, J.,
concurring). Cf City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 567, 611 P.2d
741 (1980) (Supreme Court of Washington held that cable television was not a

"public utility" within meaning of state statute; statute did not define "public utility" and gave cities regulatory powers over utilities).
Of the eleven states with comprehensive cable statutes, seven currently regulate
through their public utility commissions. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION AssOCIATIoN, INTERACTION 4 (Jul. 1980). For a complete discussion of state regulation of
cable television as of 1977, see S. BRILEY, STATE REGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISONPROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, THE CABLE BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK 31 (M.

Hollyweil ed. 1977).
30. AB 2742, 1981-82 Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1982).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 reads:

No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and siver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Id. (emphasis added).

32. A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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regulations for the operation thereof. Former California Constitution Article XI, section 19,33 granted constitutional status to municipal corporations when they provide light, water, power, heat,
transportation, telephone service, or other means of communication to their inhabitants, or provide for the franchising of those
activities. 34 In 1970, tha; provision was slightly modified and renumbered as Article XI, section 9.35 The report of the Law Revision Commission indicates that the two provisions are
substantially identical in intent and effect. Thus, a municipal corporation hag the constitutional authority to franchise systems
providing communications services subject to reasonable regulation by the host jurisdiction, including the power to regulate
rates. The attachment of reasonable conditions to this grant is incident to the municipality's constitutional power to regulate its
streets and highways in the public interest.36 A municipality may
grant or withhold the franchise privileges for the use of its public
33. Repealed June 2, 1970, (current version at CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 9).
34. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 19 (repealed June 2, 1970) states:
Any municipal corporation may establish and operate public works for
supplying its inhabitants with lights, water, power, heat, transportation,
telephone service or other means of communication. Such works may be
acquired by original construction or by the purchase of existing works, including their franchises, or both. Persons or corporations may establish
works for supplying the inhabitants with such services upon such condition and under such regulations as the municipality may prescribe under
its organic law, on condition that the municipal government shall have the
right to regulate the charges thereof. A municipal corporation may furnish such services to inhabitants outside its boundaries; provided, that it
shall not furnish any service to the inhabitants of any other municipality
owning or operating works supplying the same service to such inhabitants
without the consent of such other municipality, expressed by ordinance.
Id.
35. CA1. CONST. art. XI, § 9 states:
(a) a municipal corporation may establish, purchase, and operate public
works to furnish its inhabitants with light, water, power, heat, transportation, or means of communication. It may furnish those services outside its
boundaries, except within another municipal corporation which furnishes
the same service and does not consent.
(b) Persons or corporations may establish and operate works for supplying those services upon conditions and under regulations that the City
may prescribe under its organic law.
Id.
36. See Colgrove Water Co. v. City of Hollywood, 151 Cal. 425, 90 P. 1053 (1907)
(city can place reasonable restrictions on use of roads and area above and below
so that travel is not inhibited; city may not regulate a non-interfering use by fee
owner of land); Hayes v. Handley, 182 Cal. 273, 187 P. 952 (1920) (mandamus issued
against city to compel the construction of tunnel which placed no burden on adjoining land owners since it was valid use by city of public roads).

streets or rights-of-way for public or private uses. 37
Local government entities also possess the statutory authority
to regulate cable television rates within their jurisdictional
boundaries pursuant to Government Code section 53066.38 Cities
are specifically empowered to "prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems advisable to protect the individual subscribers
39
to the services of such community antenna television system."
Cities are to consider the rates charged for cable television services in the award of a franchise, and prescribe rules and regulations to govern it.4o Although the California Legislature has seen
fit to statutorially authorize municipal franchising and regulation
of cable television systems, statutory authorization is not necessary given the parameters of the constitutional grant. The California Attorney General has specifically and expressly stated that
a cable television system is a "public work" within the meaning of
Article XI, section 9 of the California Constitution. 4 1 Cable television is thus a "means of communication" within, the meaning of
the Article. 42 California municipalites possess a full range of con37. Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 32 Cal. App. 738, 154 P. 35 (1917)
(franchise granted to telegraph company to run wire over streets; company could
remove any obstruction of transmission (i.e., trees) if the city would have been
able to do so, when it interferes with public use of roads).
38. The statute provides:
Community antenna television system; franchise or license; rules and regulations.
Any city or county or city and county in the State of California may,
pursuant to such provisions as may be prescribed by its governing body,
authorize by franchise or license the construction of a community antenna
television system. In connection therewith, the governing body may prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems advisable to protect the individual subscribers to the services of such community antenna television
system. The award of the franchise or license may be made on the basis
of quality of service, rates to the subscriber, income to the city, county or
city and county, experience and financial responsibility of the applicant
plus any other consideration that will safeguard the local public interest,
rather than a cash auction bid. The maximum franchise fee for any
franchise or license hereafter awarded pursuant to this section or pursuant to any ordinance adopted under authority of this section by any city or
county or city and county shall be 5 percent of the grantee's gross receipts
from its operations within such city or county or city and county. Any
cable television franchise or license awarded by a city or county or city
and county pursuant to this section may authorize the grantee thereof to
place wires, conduits and appurtenances for the community antenna television system alonq or across such public streets, highways, alleys, public
properties, or public easements of said city or county or city and county.
Public easements, as used in this section, shall include but shall not be
limited to any easement created by dedication to the city or county or city
and county for public utility purposes or any other purpose whatsoever.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066 (West Supp. 1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 54 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 135, 137 (1971).
42. See supra note 34 for text of the article.
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stitutional powers in relation to cable television systems which
cannot be abridged or modified by legislation. In addition, the
mandates of Article XI, section 9 are self-executing and require
43
no implementing legislation.
Finally, California municipalities possess the contractual right,
to the extent the franchise agreement so provides, to approve the
rates charged by a cable television operator for the provision of
basic services, and any modification of those rates without approval by the governing body constitutes a breach of contract. It
is well established in California that franchises in general,4 4 and
46
45
cable television franchises in particular, are contracts.
It is beyond question that contracts entered into between municipalities and private parties, including franchise agreements,
are governed by the ordinary law of contracts, 47 and California
43. 54 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 1.35, 139 (1971).
44. Tulare County v. Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 669, 206 P. 983, 985 (1922) (court held
fees payable'under franchise agreement is contractual debt not a tax).
45. City of Lafayette v. American Television and Communications Corp., 98
Cal. App. 3d 27, 159 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979) (cities incorporated after cable franchise
entered with county are bound by franchise terms); Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429
(1976) (city not obligated to pass requested rate increase unless bound by
franchise agreement); Three Rivers Cablevision v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp.
1118 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (normal contractual bid procedures must be followed in
awarding franchise agreement).
46. In United States Trust, Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) the United
States Supreme Court explained: "In general, a statute is itself treated as a contract when the language and circumstances evince a legislatie intent to create
private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State." Id. at 17, n.14.
The contractual nature of the relationship between a city and a cable company
was a prerequisite to the injunction entered by the district court in Community
Communications Co. v. Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1980) because the district judge found that the contract requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act
was met by the agreement between the cable company and the city. In finding
that antitrust liability could be imposed on the city, the Supreme Court must have
accepted this analysis; in fact, Justice Rhenquist's dissent criticized the "ease with
which the ordinance in the instant case has been labled a 'contract'.

. .

." Com-

munity Com. Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65, n.1 (1982) (Rhenquist, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 438 A.2d 933 (Md. 1982)
(arbitration clause of contract with city requires more than letter containing notice of default, some oral modilcation permitted despite requirement of writing);
Anne Arundel County v. Crofton Corp., 286 Md. 666, 410 A.2d 228 (1980) (contract
for special sewage fees held not to be affected by subsequent legislation increasing fees); Ketterer v. Independent School Dist. #1, 248 Minn. 212, 79 N.W.2d 428
(1956) (statutorially authorized sale of property valid absent fraud, collusion, bad
faith or inadequate consideration despite governing board's specific authorization); Burger v. City of Springfield, 323 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1959) (city resolution authorizing employment of water works negotiator at reasonable compensation and

courts treat municipal contracts in no unique fashion.48
IV.

STATE DEREGULATORY LEGISLATION CAN CONSTITUTE AN
UNLAWFUL. IMPAIRMENT OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS

When the California Legislature adopted section 53066.1,49
which gave cable television companies the right to exempt themselves from local rate regulation, it created the potential for the
unconstitutional impairment of existing contracts. Without a
doubt, the franchise agreements between municipalities and
cable operators are contracts imbued with all normal contractual
characteristics. 5 0

This form of franchise contract is protected

written acceptance by party constitutes valid contract); Beverly Sewerage Auth. v.
Delano Sewerage Auth., 65 NJ. Super. 86, 167 A.2d 46 (1961) (contractual authority
valid when challenged as means to acheive rescission or modification of a sewage
disposal contract); Greenberg v. City of New York, 152 Misc. 488, 274 N.Y.S. 4
(1934) (city bus franchises could not be invalidated or revoked without sufficient
justification); Jones v. City of Middletown, 96 N.E.2d 799 (Ohio 1950) (city contract
for engineering services breached when city enters contract with another engineer
for same work and prohibiting original firm to perform); Scott Paper Co., v. City of
Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978) (city contract to deliver water at
below market price held valid despite subsequent constitutional amendment requiring adequate compensation for water service).
48. See Souza & McCue Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 508, 370 P.2d
338, 20 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1962) (immunity does not apply to municipality that misleads other party during contract negotiations); M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2d 7 (1951) (rescission of bid permitted despite
ordinance to the contrary when sufficient evidence indicates mistake); Morrison
Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976)
(city provision of sewage facilities in annexation agreement held a valid contract
and not an attempt to contract away legislative power); Guntert v. City of Stockton, 43 Cal. App. 3d 203, 117 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1974) (city bound by lease requirements
in exercising termination clause); American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. v. Home
Saving and Loan Ass'n, 38 Cal. App. 3d 73, 112 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974) (water system
construction costs allocation required by contract must be enforced by unambiguous terms of agreement); Holtzendorff v. Housing Auth., 250 Cal. App. 2d 596, 58
Cal. Rptr. 886 (1967) (damages are recoverable for wrongful discharge under an
employee contract with governmental agency); Carruth v. City of Madera, 233 Cal.
App. 2d 688, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1965) (city bound by annexation agreement in which
property owner complies with conditions of the agreement); Sawyer v. City of San
Diego, 138 Cal. App. 2d 652, 292 P.2d 233 (1956) (city bound by 30-year-old contract
to provide water to neighborhood); Oberg v. City of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. App. 2d
151, 281 P.2d 591 (1955) (extra work under city construction contract recoverable
but only to that amount not covered by contract); Trans World Airlines v. City and
County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1955) (rate set by contract for airport lease cannot be changed by enactments); see also McQUnMLu, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 29.124, 560-61 (3d ed. 1981).
49. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
statute.
50. As the court states in Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City of
San Clemente:
Accordingly, if the appellant is not a public utility, the only possible relationship of the parties is one based on contract. Appellant itself conceded
as much by citing cases which characterized the relationship as such (e.g.,
Los Angeles Ry. Co. v. Los Angeles, 152 Cal. 242 [92 P.4901), including two
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against state impairment.5 1 Although little can be said with certainty, a reasonable argument could be made for the proposition
that statutes such as section 53066.1 unreasonably impair a municipality's obligation of contract in violation of both federal and
state constitutional protections.
Both the United States and California constitutions prohibit the
52
adoption of any law which impairs any obligation of contract.
3
As stated in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,5
the United States constitutional provision, read literally, proscribed "any" impairment of contract. However, it is "not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula."5 4 Thus, in El Paso v. Simmons, 55 the
Court held that "[ilt is not every modification of contractual
promise that impairs the obligation of the contract under federal
law ... ."56 According to the Court, the state "has the sovereign
right . .. to protect the ... general welfare of the people [and]
we must respect the 'wide discretion on the part of the Legislature in determining what, is and what is not necessary.' ,,
However, the authority of the state to impair contracts based on
the exercise of its police power is not absolute. The United States
Supreme Court in Blaisdell delineated four factors warranting
legislative impairment of vested contractual rights.58 First, the
enactment must serve to protect basic interests of society. Second, there must be an emergency justification for the enactment.
The enactment must be appropriate for the emergency. Finally,
the enactment must be designed as a temporary measure, during
which time the vested contract rights are not lost but merely de59
ferred for a brief period.
The Blaisdell decision involved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium statute designed to provide relief to land owners whose
out-of-state cases which actually invoved cable television franchises (City
of Owensboro v. Top Visions Cable Co. of Ky. (Ky. (1972) 487 S.W.2d 283;
Bush v. Upper Valley Telecable Co., 96 Idaho 83 [524 P.2d 1055]).
59 Cal. App. 3d at 171, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 433.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

CA. CONST. art. I, § 9. See supra note 31 for text.
See supra notes 30-31.
Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id. at 428.
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 508-09.
290 U.S. 398, 444-47.
Id.

property was foreclosed during the Great Depression. The statute
extended the period of redemption from foreclosure for two years.
The United States Supreme Court had no problem finding an
emergency situation justifying the impairment. Also, according to
the Court, the legislation served to protect the basic interest of society rather than providing an advantage for particular individuals. Finally, given the extent of the emergency, the Supreme
Court ruled that the statute in question was reasonable in terms
of its parameters and impact. The temporary duration of the statute was also a determining factor in finding the statute's validity
when challenged on impairment grounds.
The factors itemized in Blaisdell have been applied to subsequent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and, on
the basis of these factors, statutes have been held invalid when
challenged as a violation of the contract clause. For example, in
Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association,60 a statute modifying existing rules covering withdrawals from building and loan associations was held invalid on the grounds that it did not purport to
deal with an existing emergency. Furthermore, it was neither
temporary or conditional and deprived withdrawing members' existing contractual rights in order to benefit those who remained.
In W.P. Worthen Company v. Kavanaugh,61 a statute similar to
that in Blaisdell, which diluted the rights of mortgage brokers
was found to be "an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of
nearly all instants that gave attractiveness and value to collateral
security." 62 The Court distinguished Blaisdell on the ground that
the statute involved there was less restrictive. 63 And in W.B.
Worthen Company v. Thomas,64 a law which exempted the proceeds of life insurance policies from judgment creditor collection
was held invalid because the exemption was not temporary or
conditional. The statute also failed to contain limitations as to
time, amount, circumstances, or need.
Existing case law makes it apparent that police power legislation that does not meet all of the listed criteria of Blaisdell stands
a strong likelihood of being found contrary to the contract clause.
Furthermore, the courts have established a sliding scale test to
evaluate the reasonableness of the impairing legislation. In other
60. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
61. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
62. Id. at 62.
63. The statute in Worthen precluded any foreclosure activity for six and onehalf years after default, did not provide for the payment of the rental value during
this period if the mortgagee retained possession, and provided no incentive for the
mortgagee to pay the debt. The two-year period in Blaisdell plus the incentive
and rent features in that statute aided the court in its justification.
64. W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
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words, the greater the impairment to the contract, the greater the
burden on the state to show the reasonableness of its actions. In
Allied StructuralSteel Co. v. Spannaus,65 the Court ruled that although a minimal alteration of contractual obligations would call
for a lesser standard of inquiry, a severe impairment "will push
the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of
the state legislation." 66 'In that case, a statute was invalidated because it imposed a substantial liability on corporations and was
not a temporary alteration of contractual terms, but a severe and
permanent change in those conditions. The Court also found that
the legislation was not necessary to meet an important general
societal problem and that it was not in response to nearly the sort
of economic emergency that prompted the legislation in Blaisdell.
Because the statute involved such a severe impairment of the
complainant's rights, the Court said that the height of the hurdle
the state legislation must clear is elevated and a careful examina67
tion of its nature and purpose is required.
If the impairment challenge is asserted against legislation that
modifies a contract in which the government itself is a party, the
test used by the Court is whether the legislation is reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,68 the government adopted legislation impairing obligations entered into between itself and a private party. In order to further the program of mass transit, the
legislation repealed a covenant in a bi-state contract involving the
New York Port Authority. The Court found this legislation to be
an unconstitutional impairment of contract because the destruction of the important security provision for the protection of bondholders was neither reasonable nor necessary to serve the
important state interest.
The California Supreme Court, in Sonoma County Organization
of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma,69 was faced with a
challenge to a statute that was contrary to contractual provisions
pending between the local government and private individuals. In
that case, the California Legislature enacted Government Code
65. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
66. Id. at 245.
67. Id.
68. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
69. Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d
296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).

section 16280,70 which prohibited the distribution of state surplus
or loan funds to any local agency granting its employees a cost-of-

living, wage, or salary increase for the 1978-1979 fiscal year which
exceeded the cost-of-living increase provided for state employees.
The statute also declared null and void any agreement by a local
agency to pay a cost of living increase in excess of that granted to
state employees. The statute was attacked by several organizations representing employees of local government agencies. In
deciding whether or not there was an unconstitutional impairment of contract, the California Supreme Court reviewed the major cases involving impairments of contract, including most of
those noted herein. Although the court acknowledged that the
California Legislature enacted an emergency clause in response
to the passage of Proposition 1371 by the voters of California, 72 the
court held that the state did not meet its burden in establishing
that a crisis truly existed. Relying upon out-of-state authority,73
the California Supreme Court held that the impairment of a contract was unjustified unless the state could show an economic
emergency of broad scope, and then, only on "rare occasions and
extreme circumstances do rights fixed by the terms of a contract
...
give way to a greater public need." 74 However, in the absence
of emergency justification, the sanctity of private contract cannot
be unreasonably disturbed.75
70. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16280 basically provides that any local government that
gives a greater wage increase than is given to state employees will be precluded
from receiving surplus or loan funds from the state. The statute declares any existing contractual clause that is contrary to be void. The statute specifically exempts increases due to merit, position transfers (unless the purpose is to avoid
the statute), and fringe benefits. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16280 (West 1980).
71. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. The article basically limits the amount of tax that
can be assessed on property to one percent of the full cash value of the real property. See CAL. CONST. art. XII § 1 (West Supp. 1982).
72. The asserted "emergency" was the fiscal difficulties that arose after the
adoption of the amendment. 23 Cal. 3d at 309, 591 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 909
(1979).
73. Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Hannett, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 376 N.E.2d 1280, 405
N.Y.S.2d 634 (1978). The New York Court of Appeals held invalid as contrary to
the contract clause a statute requiring health and accident insurance policies to
provide for maternity coverage. The challengers to the statute were insurance
companies with existing policies and those renewable at the sole option of the
insured.
74. 23 Cal. 3d at 313, 591 P.2d at 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (1979) (quoting Health
Ins. Ass'n v. Harnett, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 376 N.E.2d 1280, 405 N.Y.S.2d 634). The court
also relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court opinions in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), and United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
75. The Supreme Court noted in Blaisdell that an emergency situation does
not give rise to new powers, but rather only provides an opportunity for the exercise of existing powers. Emergency conditions would not allow a state to change
the specific limitations found in the constitution, but when the provision is broad
(such as the impairment clause), then judicial construction would be appropriate.
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Under the contract clause, it is immaterial whether the obligation of contract is impaired by acting on the remedy or directly
upon the contract-impairment in either case is prohibited. 76 A
statute impairs the obligations of a contract if it prevents enforcement, tends to postpone enforcement, or seriously interferes with
the enforcement of the contract.7 7 More importantly, a law may
be within the constitutional inhibition of the contract clause by
implication, as well as expression. 78 "There is no difference in
principle between a law which directly and in terms impairs the
obligation of contract and one which produces the same effect in
79
its plain construction and practical operation."
That construction need not be limited by the clauses that appear with the contract
clause. 290 U.S. at 425-27.
Footnote 19 to the United States Trust case expressly stated that the Court was
retracting the requirements of an emergency situation and legislation of a limited
duration as indicated by the cases of Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass'n,
310 U.S. 32 (1940) (no requirement of emergency or temporary relief) and East
New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (permitting the tenth extension of a one year moratorium). The United States Trust case applied only the
contract clause of the United States Constitution. State constitutions may still
hold these requirements to be necessary, as do courts in California. See Olson v.
Cory, 27 Cal. 3d 532, 609 P.2d 991, 164 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1980).
76. Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105 (1917) (statute allowing county not
to collect certain tax assessments delegated to retiring bonds held an impairment
of the creditors' contracts); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890) (prohibition
against the redemption of state bonds for tax debts owed is an impairment of contract); Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1880) (statutory abolition of imprisonment
for debts does not constitute an impairment of any pre-existing contracts).
77. See International Steel and Iron Co. v. National Surety Co., 297 U.S. 657
(1936) (retroactive substitution of sureties in construction contracts held an impairment); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903) (modification
of available remedies is not an impairment if provision for enforcement is present); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1895) (creation of a right of redemption in
mortgage foreclosures cannot apply to a pre-existing mortgage); Shreveport v.
Cole, 129 U.S. 36 (1889) (state constitutional amendment was valid as it only applied to prospective contracts); Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U.S. 284 (1887) (repeal and
replacement of statute providing collection methods for bonds not applicable to
existing debts); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880) (modification of collection procedures requiring additional action is an invalid impairment when applied to existing judgments); Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. 627 (1877) (laws in
existence at time contract is entered control the transaction); Gunn v. Barry, 82
U.S. 610 (15 Wall.) (1872) (post-Civil War forced constitutional change destroying
an existing lien is an unconstitutional impairment); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (4 Wall.) (1866) (provision for tax assessment to redeem bonds
held to be contract and cannot be avoided); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. 311 (1 How.)
(1843) (imposition of period of redemption invalid if applied to pre-existing
mortgages).
78. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N.W. 204 (1902) (state cannot take away
municipalities' right to obtain services for its own citizens).
79. Tax Comm'n v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 179 Md. 125, 134, 17 A.2d 101, 104 (1940)

Under California law, the discretion of the legislature to impair
contracts which confer substantive rights is severely limited. Any
modification of the contract which results in a substantial disadvantage to the impaired party must be accompanied by a concomitant advantage. In weighing the impairment against the benefit
of a contract modification, the court must give credence to the importance given the impaired right by the complaining party. 80
The validity of the attempted contract modification depends upon
the advantage or disadvantage to the complaining party whose
rights are involved. Benefits to third parties cannot offset detriments imposed upon those whose contractual rights have been
relegated. 81 In short, this comparative analysis of costs versus
gains must focus upon the particular party whose contract rights
82
are involved.
The ratemaking power is viewed by most local governments
and their elected officials as an essential ingredient of any
franchise contract and a right which the local government enjoys
for its own benefit and the benefit of its citizens. From the viewpoint of the city or county providing the judging criteria, the meager and paltry benefits in terms of public access facilities
provided by section 53066.183 do not compensate the municipality
or its residents for the dramatically escalating rates.
Although the results are far from clear, it could be persuasively
argued that the State of California, through section 53066.1, causes
the direct impairment of contracts between local governments
and private parties. Just as in the County of Sonoma 84 case, the
(railroad charter a contract with taxation provisions not subject to change by
legislation).
80. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 326 P.2d 484 (1958) (modification of pension and unlawful impairment when applied to vested party); Allen v.
City of Long Beach, 45 Cal. 2d 128, 287 P.2d 765 (1955) (vested pension rights are
contractual and can only be modified to participants' detriment if benefit is given
in its place); Stork v. California, 62 Cal. App. 3d 465, 133 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1976)
(reclassification in pension program destroys expectation and is an invalid impairment); City of Downey v. Board of Admin., 47 Cal. App. 3d 621, 121 Cal. Rptr. 295
(1975) (modification requiring statewide pooling of pension funds valid as benefits
are increased); Frazier v. Tulare County Bd. of Retirement, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1046,
117 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974) (county retirement policy allowing named beneficiaries
cannot be modified by statute after death of insured).
81. Wisley v. City of San Diego, 188 Cal. App. 2d 482, 10 Cal. Rtpr. 765 (1961)
(police and fire pension plans contribution requirements modification held an invalid impairment of a contract that vested upon employment).
82. Betts v. Board of Admin., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 582 P.2d 614, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1978) (pensioner entitled to plan in effect upon retirement rather than a modification if the modification fails to provide additional benefits to companies for the
rights given up).
83. See' supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
statute.
84. Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d

[Vol. 10: 691, 19831

Cable Television
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

impairment in issue cannot be justified on the basis of the four requirements set forth in the Blaisdell8 5 decision. First, section

53066.1 was not adopted, or legislatively justified, as a result of an
emergency situation. The statute is not by its terms emergency
legislation, nor does it purport to specify the emergency situation

which predicated its passage. In fact, no public purpose findings
were made by the legislature. Second, section 53066.1 was not enacted for the protection of a basic interest of scciety, but rather

was adopted and intended to provide special rights and privileges
to cable television operators. Thirdly, section 53066.1 was not an

appropriate response to an emergency situation and the conditions imposed upon existing contracts were not reasonable or

necessary under the circumstances. If the California Legislature
was concerned about municipal abuses of rate regulation, it could
have set standards or criteria governing the exercise thereof, as

opposed to allowing the total abolition of municipal
regulation.
Given the fact that municipal regulation of cable television
ters around rate regulation in many cases, section 53066.1
stantially destroys the ability of California municipalities

rate
censuband

counties to protect its citizens from monopolistic abuses of market power. There is not a single situation in this state where
86
there exists true competition within the cable television market.
296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979). See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the case.
85. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See supra notes
52-58 and accompanying text.
86. Over 99% of cable operators enjoy an absolute monopoly. There are approximately 4,000 cable systems operating in the United States. Of that number,
"[o]nly five municipalities are known to have granted franchises that encourage
two companies to compete. They are Paramus, N.J.; Allentown, Pa; Hammond,
Ind.; Boulder, Colo.; and Bridgeview, a suburb of Chicago." N.Y. Times, Apr. 14,
1980, § C at 18, col. 4. Even if a community decided to issue multiple franchises,
market forces and economies of scale would preclude actual competition. Barnett,
Cable Television and Media Concentration,Part I: Controlof Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters,22 STAN. L REV. 221, 240-41 (1970); Barrow, ProgramRegulation
in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L REV. 515, 517
(1975); Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L REV. 419, 437 n.152, 451
(1972); Collins, The Future of Cable Communicationsand the FairnessDoctrine, 24
CATH. U.L REV. 833, 846 (1975).
As one commentator recently stated:
Cable television appears to meet this definition of a natural monopoly.
The largest portion of a cable company's expenses, such as the headend
and distribution system, are fixed costs. These costs are both extremely
high and independent of the number of subscribers to the cable system.
Additionally, having competing cable companies is economically ineffl-

Absent municipal rate control, cable television operators are literally able to excise horrendous rates from vulnerable subscribers,
especially in those areas of poor off-the-air reception. In many
cases, the rate regulation provisions of franchise agreements were
the most hotly debated and negotiated sections, in light of the
city's fear of price abuse. To strip municipalities of their ability to
regulate the prices of cable television services within their jurisdictional boundaries constitutes an unreasonable impairment of
the municipality's contractual benefits. The question of whether
statutes such as section 53066.1 unlawfully impair contracts is a
question of fact which can only be determined by the trial court,
following a thorough sifting and weighing of all relevant evidence. 87 Certainly, credible arguments could be made in support
of the proposition that the benefits conferred by the statute more
than offset the losses.
The finding that a statute impairs an obligation of contract does
not end, but rather begins the inquiry. The court must weigh the
magnitude of the impairment against any benefits conferred, giving at all times due deference to the significance of the public policy served by the enactment. 88 Obligations of contract must yield
to a proper exercise of the state's police powers, provided the
power is exercised for a public purpose and the means adopted
are reasonably designed to accomplish that purpose. 89 As compensation for the loss of rate regulation powers, cable operators
could point to the fact that section 53066.1 requires, as a condition
of rate deregulation or adjustment, (1) a rebuilding of the cable
television system in order to provide the requisite channels of
cient since each company would have to duplicate the cables and equipment of the others.
Cable television has indeed developed as a monopoly industry throughout the country. Of the 4,200 cable television systems currently operating,
there are an estimated eight instances of so-called "overbuilds" - two
cable companies competing for the same subscribers. Historically, overbuilds have been eliminated by one company buying out the other, though
occasionally other agreements are reached, such as dividing the locality
among the competing cable companies with the understanding that no
company will go into another's "priority service area" unless that company has clearly failed to meet its commitments in its priority area.
Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Televtision Operator: An Unprotective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMMENT J. COMMUNICATIONS

L., 1, 7-8 (1981).
87. Betts v. Board of Admin., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 582 P.2d 614, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158
(1978). See supra note 81 for a discussion of the case.
88. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 513-17 (1965); Sonoma County Org. of
Pub. Employees, 23 Cal. 3d at 307, 591 P.2d at 6, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (1979) (citing
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)); Frazier v. Tulare
County Bd.of Retirement, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1046, 1049, 117 Cal. Rptr. 386, 388 (1974).
89. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977); Treigle v.
Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).
AND ENTERTAINMENT
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programming, 90 (2) the construction of a satellite earth receiving

station allowing subscribers to enjoy satellite programming, 91 (3)
a significant commitment to public access in terms of channel capacity, equipment, and funding, 92 and (4) improved subscriber
complaint procedures with the ability to enforce monetary penalites for inadequate or substandard service. 93 Cable operators
have successfully argued, that statutes such as section 53066.1 encourage cable systems to expend considerable capital to rebuild
their plant and thereby provide subscribers with state-of-the-art
services.
Although cable operators may argue that benefits are conferred
upon the public as a result of rate deregulation, the facts simply
do not support this. In reality, the expansion of plant capacity
which has occurred in this country over the past several years is
not a function of rate deregulation, but rather the increased programming which is now available via satellite. Without plant capacity in excess of twelve channels, cable operators are unable to
share in the fruits of premium programming which now constitutes a significant portion of cable revenues. The decision to increase plant capacity is a complex business decision based upon
a multiplicity of factors, including, but not limited to, the ability to
charge higher rates. 94 Neither the quality, quantity, nor diversity
of programming has improved measurably as a result of rate deregulation. 95 Public access programming has stagnated under
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53066.1(a) (1) (1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 679) (West).

91. Id.at § 53066.1(a) (2).
92. Id. at § 53066.1(a) (3).
93. Id. at § 53066.1(g) (3).
94. The California Public Broadcasting Commission (CPBC) was mandated
under Government Code § 53066.1 to perform a study upon the effects of the statute. In the Executive Summary to the Report, they discuss the correlation between plant capacity and rate deregulation:
Increased channel capacity is associated with several factors, including
the age of existing cable plant, the availability of cash from the parent
company, the market for pay services, the number of "must-carry" stations, demand for community service, and a rate structure which makes
increasing channel capacity a financially viable decision. Although the
channel upgrades in the AB 699 group cannot be attributed entirely to the
enactment of AB 699 they may not have been so common in the AB 699
communities had the bill not been adopted.
CPBC, Executive Summary to the Report on AB 699, at viii (1981) [hereinafter
cited as CPBC].
95. "With respect to enhancement of service, the overall trend toward more
channels, satellite-delivered services, and diversity of channel service does not appear to substantively differ in AB 699 Systems as compared to other systems."
CPBC, supra note 93, at vi.

the reign of section 53066.1 except in those jurisdictions where
municipalities were able to require meaningful public access and
local origination commitments through a franchising process. 96
Whatever the paltry benefits bestowed upon local governments
and their citizens through section 53066.1, the cost in terms of sizable rate increases 97 are more than offsetting.9 8 In United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey,9 9 the United States Supreme Court held
that even the social significance of mass transit did not justify intrusion into the sanctity of contract. 100 Certainly, cable operators
who knowingly and intelligently entered into franchise agreements which contained rate regulation clauses merit no greater
deference from the courts.
V.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ENTITIES HAVE STANDING TO ATTACK THE
CONSTITUTIONAIrY OF STATE DEREGULATORY STATUTES
UNDER THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE

Assuming that statutes such as Government Code section
53066.1, under the balancing tests of Blaisdell and Sonoma, con96. "Even where the provisions of AB 699 have been implemented, local

government, community organizations, and educational organizations perceived no increased service benefits or measurable changes in community
service programming as a result of AB 699.
The Foundation for Community Service Television - established as a
resource for statewide community service cable, for educating local organizations about cable, and for grant programs to deliver programming has received trivial funding via AB 699 and has been stymied in trying to
serve both statewide and local community service objectives.
Data from cable companies and cities show that most cable systems in
California have some form of community service channel availability regardless of their relationship to AB 699; but limited use is being made of
these channels. Rate regulation or deregulation in a particular franchise
area seems to be unrelated to channel availabilty or use. Thus, the Commission believes that the attempt to link community service cable to rates
or rate deregulation will not work.
CPBC, supra note 93, at vi.
97. In several cities where cable operations were deregulated under section
53066.1, rate increases of between 50%-100% were imposed upon subscribers. The
California cities of Pittsburgh, Antioch, Pleasant Hill, Milpitas, and San Luis
Obispo are glaring examples of these excesses. All of these municipalities instituted litigation against their cable operators challenging the deregulation.
98. Despite the .iorror stories of excessive rate increases as a result of section
53066.1, the California Public Broadcasting Commission found, on balance, "that
rate deregulation has an innocuous effect upon rates ....

" CPBC, 6upra note 93,

at iW.
99. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
100. The Court noted the importance of the legitimate goals of reducing traffic
congestion. Their decision, however, was based on the determination that the repeal was not necessary to acheive the goal because there existed less intrusive alternatives than complete destruction. In addition, the Court noted the historical
financial problems involved in mass transit. The covenant that was repealed was
intended to prevent the Port Authority from destroying its creditors' interests. As
such, the effects of the covenant and its repeal were not unforeseeable events at
the time it was adopted. Id. at 28-32.
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stitute unlawful impairments of contract, the difficult question remains of whether a municipality possesses standing to assert the
impairment claim against the state. It has been repeatedly held
that federal and state constitutional limits on the impairment of
contracts do not apply to a contractual right in favor of a municipal corporation. 101 These rules regarding the substantive rights of
local government, or more specifically the lack thereof, to complain that any legislation has impaired a right or privilege accru02
ing by contract have often been stated as rules of standing.'
However, the power of the state to modify and infringe upon the
contractual rights of one of its political entities is not absolute. A
distinction must be made between the property and contractual
rights held by a municipality in its public and governmental capacity, and those contractual and property rights held by a city in
its private or proprietary capacity. The case of New Orleans v.
New Orleans Water Works Co., 103 held that a municipal corporation, with respect to its private or proprietary rights, might be entitled to constitutional protection. In that case, the United States
Supreme Court stated that in its governmental capacity, the municipality "being a mere agent of the state, stands in its governmental or public character in no contract relation with its
sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may be amended,
changed or revoked, without the impairment of any constitutional
101. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (state grant of tax
exempt status binding on cities); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1923)
(state imposed penalty on city for diversion of water upheld); Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (revocation of city charter valid); City of
Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1905) (state release of railroads duty to repair streets in cities valid); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 88-92 (1891) (state revocation of tax free status
can require a city to pay for its own water); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283, 290 (S.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (state curfew on airline flights enjoined); Mallon v.
City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 209, 282 P.2d 481, 187 (1955) (revocation of conveyance of land to city by state -valid); County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d
276, 284, 106 P.2d 11, 15 (1940) (cancellation of a public assistance lien); County of
Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664, 669, 206 P. 983, 985 (1922) (county franchise
fee for electrical wire easement).
102. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283, 289 (S.D. Cal.
1978); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &F. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
Jurisdiction § 3531 (1975); 5 WrraaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW: Constitutional
Law § 619 (8th ed. 1974). Thus., as stated in FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
(supra), "[p] olitical subdivisions of states have been held to lack constitutional
rights against the creating state, a conclusion that is at times translated into a lack
of standing to challenge state policies." Id. at 234 (footnotes omitted).
103. New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891).

obligation."10 4 But, the Court went on to say, that "with respect
to its private or proprietary rights and interests it may be entitled
to the constitutional protection."1 05
In City of Worcester v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway
Co. 106 it was stated that:
In general, it may be conceded that it [a municipal corporationI can own
private property, not of a public or governmental nature, and that such
property may be entitled, as is said "to constitutional protection." Property which is held by these corporations upon conditions and terms contained in a 10grant
and for a special use, may not be diverted by the
7
Legislature.

The Court has been careful to distinguish the capacity' 0 8 in which
a municipal corporation operates so that the Court may properly
apply the restraints of the federal contracts clause. 0 9
104. Id. at 91.
105. Id.
106. 196 U.S. 537 (1905).
107. Id. at 551.
108. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Activities of the municipality
that involve a power delegated to it by the state are subject to the absolute powers
and control of the state. States can change, destroy, or combine any such activity
without federal constitutional interference or interference from its own citizens.
Where property is being held in the same manner and used as though the municipality was a private organization, then state power will be limited. Id. at 178-79.
109. It appears that the governmental/proprietary dichotomy, at least as it relates to federal constitutional claims, has been rejected by the United States
Supreme Court. In Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), the Supreme Court
rejected the City of Trenton's contention that the State could not impair the city's
rights under the contract even though they may be proprietary in nature. The
Supreme Court acknowledged the references in earlier decisions to a distinction
between acts of a municipality in a proprietary as opposed to a governmental capacity, id. at 189-91, but rejected that distinction in the context of a claim concerning impairment of contract under the federal Constitution. The Court ruled:
The basis of the distinction is difficult to state, and there is no established
rule for the determination of what belongs to the one or the other class....
Generally it is applied to escape difficulties, in order that injustice may
not result from the recognition of technical defenses based upon the governmental character of such corporations. But such distinction furnishes
no ground of the application of the constitutional restraints here sought to
be invoked by the City of Trenton against the State of New Jersey. They
do not apply as against the State in favor of its own municipalities.
Id. a 191-92.
Of course, Trenton does not speak to the application of the proprietary/governmental distinction as applied to state constitutions. More recently, in
City of Los Angeles v. City of Artesia, 73 Cal. App. 3d 450, 457, 140 Cal. Rptr. 684,
688 (1977), the court held that a statute did not impair existing contracts because
the contracting parties were public entities. The court held that public entities are
simply not entitled to claim impairment of contract or violation of due process as
against the state. Id. at 457, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 688. In San Diego Unified Port Dist. v.
Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978), the court reiterated the rule: "[a] municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has
no privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in
opposition to the will of its creator." Id. at 289 (quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933)).
See also Creighton v. Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446, 451
(1871) (holding that the city's contract did not limit or take away constitutional
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California courts have also implied the legitimacy of distinguishing acts consummated by a municipality in its governmental
capacity versus those acts performed in the municipality's proprietary capacity. In fact, the majority of cases involving a municipality's claim of impairment of contract are careful to limit the
inapplicability of the impairment clause of the California Constitution to governmental functions of the municipality.1 0 In fact,
the court in McGinn v. State Board of Harbor Commissioners"'
that "[tihe State may not impair the obligation of its contract entered into in its proprietary capacity."" 2 The weight of judicial
decision in the servile state supports the view that the constitutional guarantees which are applicable to the property rights of
private persons extend to property owned by municipalities in
their private or proprietary capacity. Although the question has
not been extensively litigated, the courts of last resort in a
number of states outside of California, have held that such consti113
tutional limitations do apply.
power of legislature); City of San Mateo v. Railroad Comm'n, 9 Cal. 2d 1, 7, 68 P.2d
713, 716 (1937) (denied city's contract impairment claim because "municipalities
organized under the General Municipal Corporation Act possess no powers which
are not subject to and controlled by general laws .. ");Pawhuska v. Pawhuska
Oil and Gas, 250 U.S. 394 (1919) (held that Oklahoma State Commission could regulate rates charged by defendant gas company without regard to city's right to
control rates pursuant to franchise agreement).
110. San Francisco Bay Conam'n v. Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 446 P.2d 790, 72
Cal. Rptr. 790 (1968) (state permit required for ongoing reclamation projects
around San Francisco Bay); Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 282 P.2d
481 (1955) (state revocation of iidelands grant includes profits earned); County of
Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940) (state cancellation of countyimposed lien held valid); Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927) (proprietary functions are given broad authority but not to exceed charter limits by using
revenues to publicize a bond election); County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal.
664, 206 P. 983 (1922) (franchise fee imposed by county is not limited by state tax
amendment); Marin Water and Power Co. v. Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 143 P. 767
(1914) (city operating own water system can do so without state rate
interference).
111. McGinn v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 113 Cal. App. 695, 299 P. 100 (1931)
(state acting as proprietor in sale of land according to a plot map cannot impair
contract by revoking the map).
112. Id. at 704, 299 P. at 104.
113. San Francisco v. Canavn, 42 Cal. 541 (1872) (state has authority to compel
use of public land in city); Linton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871) (state can compel
city expenditure for streets); Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590 (1861) (state
cannot compel sale of municipal property after state authorizes city to hold such
property); Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 39 Iowa 56 (1874) (assessed city taxes
cannot be released by state); Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. Ann. 190 (1878) (right to
collect wharf user fees cannot be abrogated by subsequent state action); New Orleans, M & C, R.R. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 517 (1874) (state can grant right

Further, although the California Legislature possesses significant plenary power over its municipalities, it is not totally free to
relegate or destroy the totality of a municipality's rights and obligations, and must adhere to fundamental constitutional guarantees. A subdivision of the state, such as a municipality or county,
possesses standing to challenge certain forms of constitutional violations committed by the state.114
Even considering the application of the governmental/proprietary dichotomy, a successful impairment challenge still
requires the demonstration that the franchising and regulation of
cable television constitutes a "proprietary" act. It is well established that when a municipality obtains for its residents such
services as water, light, or communications, whether by franchise
or through direct provision, it is acting in its proprietary or business capacity and not exercising governmental functions. 115 Likewise, it has been specifically held, at least by one court, that the
of way over city streets); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 234 Mass. 612, 127
N.E. 635 (1920) (state allocation of bridge construction expenses placing heavy
burden on some municipalities held valid); Woods v. City of Woburn, 220 Mass.
416, 107 N.E. 985 (1915) (state maximum hour day law held not to interfere with
contract between municipality and private party); Mt. Hope Cemetary v. Boston,
158 Mass. 509, 33 N.E. 695 (1893) (state law compelling transfer of city owned property as a proprietor is invalid); Portland & Willamette Valley R.R. v. Portland, 14
Or. 188, 12 P. 417 (1886) (property used by city for public purpose may be controlled by state); Spaulding v. Andover, 54 N.H. 38 (1873) (state bonds assigned to
municipality cannot be impaired by subsequent state action); Webb v. Mayor of
N.Y., 64 How. Pr. 10 (1882) (state cannot change use of land granted city in charter); Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 153 (1880) (state grant of land for school
purpose cannot later be revoked); Board of Educ. v. Haben, 22 Wis. 97 (1867)
(state compulsion of board of education funds spending); Town of Milwaukee v
City of Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 103 (1860) (state cannot divest title to property from
town to adjoining city). For a discussion of some of these cases, see McGain, The
Rights of Municipal CorporationsUnder the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 3 NAT. MUN. REV. 284 (1914); McBain, Due Processof Law and the Power of
the Legislature to Compel a Municipal Corporation to Levy a Tax or Incur Debt
for a Strictly Local Purpose, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 407 (1914).
114. Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr.
750 (1978) (county could object to state taxation statute as violation of interstate
commerce); San Carlos School Dist. v. Board of Educ., 258 Cal. App. 2d 317, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1968) (school district can challenge unlawful state redistricting of borders); Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590 (1861) (city can object to unlawful state
statute compelling transfer of property); Beverly Hills v. Los Angeles, 175 Cal. 311,
165 P. 924 (1917) (state grant of right of way through unincorporated area binding
after incorporation).
115. Wichita Water Co. v. City of Wichita, 234 F. 415 (D. Kan. 1916) (obtaining
water supply for citizens and city's own use is proprietary function); Minnesota
Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 394 F. Supp. 327 (D. Minn, 1974) (gas utility
franchise is proprietary activity); Kenton Water Co. v. City of Covington, 156 Ky.
569, 161 S.W. 988 (1913) (city cannot be forced to purchase water plant in area to
be annexed); Trottis, Inc. v. City of New York, 261 A.D. 1059, 26 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1941)
(city responsible for damage caused by broken water main as would any business
proprietor); Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n, 149 Ohio St. 347, 78 N.E.2d 890 (1948)
(franchise for gas utility is proprietary function of city); State ex rel. Froehlich v.
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regulation of cable television, if done by contract, constitutes a
1
proprietary function of a governmental entity. 16
Evans, 20 Ohio App. 419, 165 N.E. 380 (1927) (water and lights are city's proprietary
function). 2 McQumULN MUNICnPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.154 (3d ed. 1981) at 231.
116. Community Communications Co., v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D.
Colo. 1980) (injunction granted against city to allow franchisee to seek new customers). The use of this case as authority on this point is somewhat questionable,
see infra this note. It has been established that in entering into franchise agreements of any kind including cable television, muncipalities are acting in their legislative capacities. E.g., City of Worcester v. Worcester Consol. Street Ry. Co., 196
U.S. 539 (1905) (state can release obligation imposed in city right of way grant);
Pacific Telephone v. Department of Pub. Serv., 19 Wash. 2d 300, 142 P.2d 498 (1943)
(state has authority to determine rates for telephone services); City of Lafayette v.
American Television and Communication Corp., 98 Cal. App. 3d 27, 159 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1979) (areas incorporated after franchise for cable television was granted
have power to regulate rates); Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City
of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976) (city denies rate increase to cable franchisee); Byers v. Board of Supervisors, 262 Cal. App. 2d 148, 68
Cal. Rptr. 549 (1968) (county invalidly created television service district contrary
to charter); Monarch Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove, 239 Cal. App. 2d 206,
48 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1966) (discretion permitted in awarding cable franchise); Saint
Helena v. Ewen, 26 Cal. App. 19, 146 P. 191 (1914) (franchise requirement not authorized by constitution are invalid).
In Monarch Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pacific Grove, 239 Cal. App. 2d 206, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 550 (1966), the court, in holding that the plaintiffs request for certiorari was
improper, stated: "[iit is entirely clear that the action of the Council in granting
the intervenor a CATV franchise was a legislative act not a judicial one." Id. at
210, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Similarly, in Orange County Cable Communications Co. v.
City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr 429 (1976), the court held
that: "the city council, in choosing to award a franchise, was clearly acting in a legislative capacity .... Having once granted the franchise, the city council, in [denying] a request for a rate increase, continued to act in its legislative capacity."
Id. at 171, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 433 (citations omitted).
Again, in City of Lafayette v. Amercian Television and Communications Corp, 98
Cal. App. 3d 27, 159 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1979), the court stated: "we could conclude that
the county's rate-regulation function is in pure theory neither a right nor a duty
but simply a power which the county, by delegation of the people through the Legislature [Govr CODE § 53066], is entitled to exercise." Id. at 34, 159 Cal. Rptr at
276 (emphasis in original). The court continued:
Absent such a provision [Gov't Code § 53066], regulatory control of CATV
would, under general principles, have remained in the state. Hence, as between the state and its counties and cities, the counties and cities have, by
statutory delegation, acquired the right to regulate CATV within their respective geographic confines.
Id. at 32, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Since franchise regulation constitutes a legislative activity, the proprietary label
applied by the court in Boulder is questionable. The district court's opinion on
this issue was reversed on appeal. Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 707 (10th Cir. 1980). This issue was not discussed by the
United States Supreme Court when it reviewed and reversed the Tenth Circuit
opinion. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit opinion is quite specific. "The City is not in the television business in any way, and whether by contract or police power the action is an

Although a contract case involving the proprietary function of a
local governmental entity has not yet been decided by California
courts, the governmental/proprietary dichotomy detailed in the
cases above show that a municipality would have standing to assert a contract impairment claim in relation to its proprietary
functions."i7 Since local governments have chosen to enter into
private contractual relationships with their cable operators, the
state should not, and arguably cannot, utilize its police power to
usurp these contractual obligations.11 8
In addition, the cable operator who has voluntarily and intelligently accepted the provisions of a contractual agreement should
not subsequently be allowed to invoke state law to the detriment
of the contracting municipal authority.119
Finally, it should be noted that California courts have taken a
particularly liberal stance on standing, especially when questioning legislative enactments under the California Constitution. For
example, although it is relatively clear that a municipality, acting
in a governmental capacity, cannot challenge a state statute
under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, this
is clearly not the case under California state law. In Williams v.
exercise of governmental authority. There is no element of proprietary interest of
the City." 630 F.2d at 707.
It should also be noted that these holdings do not necessarily preclude the application of the proprietary label. Some types of legislative activities can be proprietary in nature since not all acts of government are governmental. In fact, a
close reading of Orange County Cable Communications Co. v. City of San Clemente, 69 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976), would suggest that if any label
is to be applied, it is the proprietary one. That case conclusively holds that the
relationship between a cable operator and its host municipaltiy is contractual.
The trial court's findings of fact on the contract issue are even discussed with approval by the appellate court. 59 Cal App. 3d 165, 173, 130 Cal Rptr. 429, 434-35. At
no time in either court was jurisdiction on the contract claim challenged. The only
analysis other than normal contract review in the Orange County Cable case was
the issue of which standards applied, those in CAi. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1085 or
those in § 1094.5. The court decided that § 1085 applied.
117. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265
(1908) (city can regulate local telephone rates during period of city granted
franchise); Plant City v. Mayo, 337 So. 2d 966 (1976) (city objection to franchise
billing procedure upheld); Pacific Telephone v. Department Pub. Serv., 19 Wash.
2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943) (state agency can set rates without preclusion under
franchise agreements).
118. City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) (objection to
welfare program by city requires a three judge court); Zee Toys, Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978) (state cannot tax items
in interstate commerce).
119. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912) (company
accepting limited rights under a franchise agreement cannot seek expanded rights
in court). See also Comment, Cable Television: The PracticalImplications of Local Regulation and Contro 27 DRAKE L. REv. 391, 414 n.165 (1977-78).
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Baltimore120 the United States Supreme Court expressly held
that the standing of a municipality to raise constitutional questions under the state constitution is a question of state law.121
In California, a local governmental entity can challenge the validity of a state statute under the California Constitution in certain circumstances. Additionally, in many cases, the California
constitutional guarantees are broader in scope and protection
than similar federal guarantees. 122 One such "independent protection" offered by the California Constitution goes further than
23
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.1
There are numerous California cases in which the cities' elected
or appointed officials, in their official capacity, were allowed to
124
challenge a state statute as unconstitutional.
VI.

REPRESENTATIVE STANDING

It is time honored that a franchise granted by a municipality to
provide some form of service to its citizens, not only constitutes a
contract between the franchisor and franchisee, but also grants
third-party beneficiary rights to the citizens of that governmental
entity who benefit from the provision of services. In addition, the
municipality, as a trustee or representative of its citizens, may
bring an action to enforce or protect its citizens' rights and privileges under the contract. Thus, even if it is determined that a
California municipality lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of state deregulatory legislation, it may be able to utilize
the "representative standing" doctrine to assert the contractual
rights of its citizens. In Market Street Railroad Co. v. Railroad
120. Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (state exemption of financially
troubled railroad from local taxes).
121. Id. at 47-48.
122. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43
Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (California Constitution similar but independent of United
States Constitution).
123. 5 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw § 344 (8th ed.
1974).
124. See Board of Educ. v. Watson, 63 Cal. 2d 82, 409 P.2d 481, 48 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1966) (county assessor challenge of statute requiring property valuations to be
given to school districts within a short time); City of Walnut Creek v. Siveira, 47
Cal. 2d 804, 60 P.2d 453 (1957) (city treasurer compelled to issue bonds authorized
by law); Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Spink, 145 Cal. App. 2d 568, 303 P.2d 46
(1956) (compelling the issuance Of bonds by utility district's secretary).

Commission,125 the California Supreme Court specifically held
that a franchise granted by the City and County of San Francisco
to a private railroad company to provide transportation services
to its citizens and residents constituted a third party beneficiary
contract. 'The city sued the State of California to enforce those
third party beneficiary rights on behalf of its citizens as a trustee
or representative. The California Supreme Court ruled that the
franchise constituted a third party contract with the citizens of
the governmental entity who were the creditor beneficiaries of the
contract. The court also ruled that the municipality had standing,
even in an action against the State, to assert and protect those
third party beneficiary rights.126 Numerous other forms of contracts entered into between a municipality and a private party
have been held to create contractual obligations which can be as1 27
serted by the municipality as a representative of its citizens.
The fact that the contract benefits both the governmental entity
and its citizens simultaneously does not preclude the assertion of
28
contractual rights by citizens.1
Perhaps the most relevant case is Olson v. County of Sacra125. Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946)
(suit to determine the recipient of excess railroad fare proceeds).
126. Id. The court stated:
It is also contended that inasmuch as the people of the city paid the excess fares they are the natural beneficiaries thereof. It is urged that the
deposition of the unclaimed portion of the fund to the city will effect in
substance its return to those who collectively are charged with the maintenance of the railway property, namely the people of the city, for the benefit of all who may avail themselves of the transportation service; and that
this will more nearly fulfill the intendments of the statutory provisions for
refund. Tables are presented showing that but 12.82 percent of all of the
passengers carried on the street railway lines in San Francisco are assumed not to be residents of the city. With an unimportant exception the
city operates all of the street railway lines in the city. Since the city is
charged with the duty to operate the system for all of its patrons it must
maintain it for outsiders as well as for the inhabitants of the city, all of
whom are the beneficiaries of the transportation service. It thus appears
that the showing of equity in favor of the city is particularly persuasive in
view of the fact that the people of the city, who were for the most part the
contributors to the fund, have now acquired the properties furnishing the
service and are now responsible to the public for their operation. They
are now interested in those properties in a proprietary as well as in a consumer capacity. In this respect they are doubly affected by the disposition
of the unrefunded excess fares.
Id. at 371-72.
127. City of Oakland v. California Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 104 P.2d 30 (1940)
(city objects to contract entered into by council one of whose members was also
an employee of the private company involved); City of Oakland v. De Guarda, 95
Cal. App. 270, 272 P. 779, modified, 273 P. 819 (1928) (adjoining landowners are beneficiaries to bond issued for street improvements).
128. Arata v. Bank of America, 223 Cal. App. 2d 199, 35 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1963)
(contract to support illegitimate children renounced by mother but enforced by
children).
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mento. 129 There, the County of Sacramento had issued an exclusive franchise for garbage collection, which is similar to the cable
television franchises granted throughout this country. The county
cross complained, inter alia, as a representative and trustee of
those residents who paid service rates for garbage collection disposal. The court of appeals expressly found that a garbage
franchise constituted a third-party beneficiary contract for the
benefit of citizens residing within the service area and that the
governmental entity granting the franchise has standing to sue on
behalf of its citizens. 13 0 The court stated:
Section 369 of the code of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part that
a "trustee of an express rust... may sue without joining with him the
persons for whose benefit the action is prosecuted. A person with whom,
or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit of another, is a
trustee of an express trust within the meaning of this section." Here the
county is 13the
"person" who made the contract for the benefit of its
1
residents.

In both of the cases cited by the court, it was the property owners in the districts who had suffered the damage, yet it was held
that the City could bring the action as trustee for them, if for no
other reason than to prevent a multiplicity of actions. The situation in the instant case is similar. Cable television franchises
should be treated as third-party beneficiary contracts much the
same as franchises for water, electricity, sewage, street improvements, and refuse collection. 132 Certainly, the benefits which citizens receive under cable television franchises equal or exceed the
rights enumerated to them under the franchises delineated above.
It should be the citizens who constitute the ultimate beneficiaries
of franchise negotiations between municipalities and their cable
129. Olson v. County of Sacramento, 274 Cal. App. 2d 316, 79 Cal. Rptr. 140
(1969) (franchisee sued county for breach of franchise contract; county cross complained for fraud).
130. Id. at 324-25, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
131. Id. See City of Oakland v. California Constr. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 573, 104 P.2d 30
(1940), where it was held that a complaint brought by the city as trustee for the
property owners to recover the proceeds of a street improvement contract obtained under the Improvement Act of 1911 on collusive bids states a cause of action; City of Oakland v. De Guarda, 95 Cal. App. 270, 272 P. 779 (1928), where the
court upheld an action by the city as trustee for property owners for damages for
breach of a bond given under the same Street Improvement Act, resulting in damages to property owners.
132. It should be noted thai. one state has held that a cable television franchise
constitutes a third party beneficiary contract between the cable operator and its
subscribers. Bush v. Upper Valley Telecable Co., 96 Idaho 83, 524 P.2d 1055 (1974)
(television subscriber could bring an action based on franchise agreement between franchisee and city as third party beneficiary).

operators, and those individuals should have some mechanism
through which to assert their rights in an economical and efficient
manner.
The rationale for representative standing is compelling. There
exists a developing doctrine in the federal courts, as well as numerous state courts, that a governmental entity has standing to
litigate matters which vitally effect its citizens or land within its
jurisdictional boundaries. In order for a municipality to assert a
claim under the representative standing doctrine, the plaintiff
must allege and prove that the challenged action has caused "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," and that the interest it seeks
to protect must be "arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the state or constitutional guarantee in
33
question."1
Although semantically this test is the same as one for direct
standing, it is applied in a far more flexible and public policy oriented manner when the claim is made in a representative
capacity.
The rules of standing are not static and fixed, but are lenient in
order to allow the courts to address issues of crucial public importance. For example, in Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 134 the court held that a nonprofit civic corporation could bring
an action to contest the issuance of a use permit. The court
stated: "[iun recent years there has been a marked accommodation of formerly strict procedural requirements of standing to sue
...and even of capacity to sue.., where matters relating to the
'social and economic realities of the present-day organization of
society'.

. .

are concerned."' 35

In following the rule in Beverly Glen, the court in Stocks v. City
of Irvine 136 stated:
In addition to conforming to California general standing principles, our
holding is reinforced by the trend in this state to apply less stringent rules
to cases litigating issues in the public interest. One court has noted the

"marked accommodations of formerly strict procedural requirements of
standing to sue ... where matters relating to social and economic
reali137
ties of the present-day organization of society" are concerned.

133. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(data processing organization had standing to object to national banks providing
data processing services to other banks and their customers).
134. Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 109 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1973) (residents of an area have standing to object to area development even
though representative organization holds no property in the area).
135. Id. at 122, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
136. Stocks v. City of Irvine, 114 Cal. App. 3d 520, 170 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1981) '(low
income non-residents challenged city's exclusionary zoning, court held standing
for state claim is less than that required federally).
137. Id. at 533, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 731. See also Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981) (organization of
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The cases extending the representative standing doctrine to
municipalities protecting the public interest are numerous. In the
case of City of Davis v. Coleman,138 the court held that the City of
Davis had standing under the National Environmental Policy Act
in both a direct and representative capacity. The potential deterioration of the quality of life of its citizens was sufficient "injury in
fact" to satisfy the first tier of the standing test. In addition, the
fact that the interest of its citizens are protected by the National
the City of Davis within the
Environmental Policy Act place
"zone of protected interest"1 39 giving it standing as a plaintiff.
Under similar reasoning, the court held that the City of Davis had
to act
standing under the California Environmental Quality14Act'40
1
in a representative capacity on behalf of its citizens.
There are numerous instances in which municipalities and
other governmental entities have been allowed to litigate the
claims of its citizens in a representative capacity. In Barcelo v.
Brown 142 actions were brought by the mayor of a local municipality and the Governor of Puerto Rico in their official capacities
and on behalf of the residents, visitors, and environment of the
Puerto Rican island. The court held that the mayor of the municipality involved had standing to prosecute the action in his "official
capacity" and that the appearance of the Governor of Puerto Rico
was "at least indicative of an 'official' stake and interest in the
controversy that justify his invocation, as Chief Executive of the
,,143
Commonwealth ....
A case which expressly relies on City of Davis is Conservation
Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke.144 There, several North
townhouse owners sued developer for defects in individual units and common areas); Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial Contracting, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981) (owners of individual units of a planned unit
development sued contractors and construction company after erosion caused
damages); Simons v. City of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1979) (neighbors sued city for allowing portable classrooms to be located on former parking lot adjoining police academy).
138. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975) (city had standing to
bring claims under Environmental Policy Act from proposed construction of freeway interchange).

139. Id. at 672.

140. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 1977).
141. 521 F.2d at 672.
142. Barcelo v. Brown, 78 F.R.D. 531 (D.P.R. 1978) (mayor had standing to assert
claim against Department of Defense for environmental damages).
143. Id. at 533.
144. Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775 (N.D.N.C. 1977)

Carolina municipalities were ruled to have standing under the
National Evironmental Policy Act to challenge the validity of certain actions of the Army Corps of Engineers. The court held,
based upon Davis, that the potential for incurring expense on the
part of the municipality from the challenged action constitutes a
sufficient "injury in fact" to give the city standing to litigate the
claim. The fact that the municipality had a "geographic nexus"
also seemed important to the court in deriving its decision.
Not every court agrees that city officials or the city itself have
standing to assert all claims of its residents. The United States
District Court, in City of Hartford v. Hills,145 held that city officials lacked standing to object to grants given by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development. The court, however, found that
the city and named residents had met the standing requirements.
On rehearing en banc before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
the district court's opinion was reversed. 146 The Supreme Court
let this decision stand.147 The case of a city asserting a claim
under a cable franchise agreement differs. The city (or other local
government unit) is a party to the contract. There was no direct
city involvement in the Hartford case. The citizens would also
meet the standing requirements as an increased service fee would
cause an added expense to the consumer citizen. The requirements set forth in the Second Circuit's opinion in Hartford148
would therefore be met.
The liberal view of a municipality's standing to initiate claims
affecting the interests of citizens was again expanded in City and
County of San Francisco v. United States. 149 In that case, District Judge Williams was asked to review the standing of the City
and County of San Francisco to challenge the actions of the Secretary of the Navy in the leasing of property in the vicinity of
Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. The city's only evidence to show
standing was based on the alleged misuse of natural resources
within its jurisdictions and the potential impact of the project
upon the city and its residents. The court expressly held that the
(city had standing to object to Army Corps of Engineers plan to dam stream), litigation stemming from previous remand, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) (remanded
summary judgment for determination of city's claim). The fourth circuit held that
the claim required a decision; the standing issue was not discussed.
145. City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
146. City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc).
147. City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
148. See 561 F.2d at 1037-41.
149. San Francisco v. United States, 443 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977), affid, 615
F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980) (city objected to Navy rejection of bid offer for leasehold in
excess property).
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potential misuse of natural resources within the jurisdiction of
the plaintiffs constituted sufficient "injury in fact" and placed the
plaintiffs within the "zone of interest to be protected" to meet the
requirements of standing. 5 0
From a public policy viewpoint, the "representative standing" is
wholly consistent with the now recognized policies of protecting
individual constitutional rights. A policy which precludes a municipality from litigating claims which significantly affect the quality of life within its jurisdiction will result in the forebearance of
these causes of action and thus deny its citizens invaluable rights
to which they are entitled. Because of the massive cost of litigation, it is unlikely that any individual citizen could financially
bear the burden of litigating the validity of state deregulatory
statutes.
Certainly these costs would, at the minimum, have a chilling effect upon the assertion of citizen's first amendment rights. Even
if an individual plaintiff could, and would, shoulder a constitutional attack on statutes such as section 53066.1, it does not seem
equitable to allocate the total costs of such a lawsuit upon any
one individual or small group of individuals, since all of the citizens of the municipality 'have a significant stake in the outcome.
There is no question that a lawsuit initiated by a municipality, in
its official capacity, on its own behalf and on the behalf of its citizens, constitutes the most rational, efficient, and equitable
method to litigate issues of vital social importance. Utilization of
such a format allows both the benefits and burdens of the lawsuit
to be progressively and fairly allocated among the members of the
community.
The "third party beneficiary representative standing" argument
is not without flaw. For example, the third party beneficiary nature of a franchise contract is subject to dispute. In Martinez v.
Socoma Companies, Inc., 151 the California Supreme Court expressly held that a general intent to benefit a third party is insufficient to establish third party beneficiary rights under a contract
with a municipality.I5 2 Relying upon section 145 of the Restate150. 443 F. Supp. at 1125-26.
151. Martinez v. Socoma Co., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1974) (contract between United States government and private companies to provide job training programs; cout held that plaintiffs were only incidental beneficiaries since purpose of contract was to improve neighborhoods).
152. Id. at 400-402, 521 P.2d at 845-46, 113 Cal Rptr. at 589-90.

ment of Contracts, 153 the court refused to allow a resident to assert contractual rights in relation to a contract between the
United States Government and a private contractor. As the court
stated: "Government contracts often benefit the public, but individual members of the public are treated as incidental beneficiaries unless a different intention is manifested."'154
Cases such as Martinez are unpersuasive. First, the nature of
the contracts in Martinez were substantially different than the
franchise agreements addressed in O/son, 155 Market Street,156 City
of Oakland,157 and Bush. 158 Martinez's contracts were essentially

public works contracts between a private party and the United
States. The primary purpose of the contracts was the general improvement of the East Los Angeles neighborhood, as opposed to
the specific training and employment of disadvantaged persons
residing in that sector. 5 9 Upon careful scrutiny, it is clear that
Martinez constitutes a case of contract interpretation, as opposed
to legal dogma. Not every public works contract will be interpreted in this manner. Even though not every public works contract will constitute a third party beneficiary contract, cable
television franchise contracts providing for a vital public service
fall within those parameters.
Second, the "third party beneficiary representative standing" issue can be attacked by arguing that third party beneficiaries can
possess no greater rights under franchise agreements than the
municipality itself.160 Although superficially appealing, the argu153. The Restatement of Contracts § 145 (1932) reads:
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by
contract to do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of
the public, is subject to no duty under the contract to such members to
give compensation for the injurious consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless,
(a) An intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light
of the circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall
compensate members of the public for such injurious consequences, or
(b) the promisor's contract is with a municipality to render services the
non-performance of which would subject the municipality to a duty to pay
damages to those injured thereby.
Id.
154. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 403 n.3, 521 P.2d 841, 846 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 n.3.
155. Olson v. County of Sacramento, 274 Cal. App. 2d 316, 79 Cal. Rptr. 140
(1969); see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
156. Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946);
see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
157. City of Oakland v. De Guarda, 95 Cal. App. 270, 227 P. 779, modified, 273 P.
819 (1928); see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
158. Bush v. Upper Valley Telecable Co., 96 Idaho 83, 524 P.2d 1055 (1974); see
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
159. Martinez v. Socoma Co., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 406, 521 P.2d 841, 848-49, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 592-93.
160. In Fruitvale Canning Co. v. Cotton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 622, 252 P.2d 953,
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ment is misdirected for two reasons. First, one must not confuse
the issue of whether a municipality possesses the substantive
right to claim contract infringement with the doctrine of standing.
Indeed, the general doctrine that a municipality cannot assert an
impairment claim against the state is not a doctrine of substantive law at all, but rather a notion of standing. It has been generally recognized that state statutes can have the effect of impairing
or materially altering a municipality's substantive right under a
contract. However, in most cases, the municipality does not pos61
sess standing to assert those claims against its parent state.1
(1953), the court held that "a third party beneficiary cannot gain any greater rights
than those of the promisee." Id. at 625, 252 P.2d at 955. Language in the Fruitvale
Canning case was later disapproved by the California Supreme Court. "Clearly
manifested intent" is no longer required as long as the promisor understood that
the promisee has such intent. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689,
15 Cal Rptr. 821, 825 (1961) (lawyer not liable to intended beneficiaries when he
drafts a will that violates the Rule against Perpetuities). In Zahn v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 509, 129 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1976), the court ruled that "a
third party beneficiary can gain no greater rights under the contract than the contracting parties." Id. at 513, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 288. See also Skylawn v. Superior
Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 316, 152 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1979) (third party beneficiary's claim
can be barred by statute of limitations even if they did not have knowledge of the
agreement until after period ran); Sanders v. American Casualty Co., 269 Cal. App.
2d 306, 74 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1969) (non-party to suretyship agreement is bound by one
year limitation period contained in contract if he sues as third party beneficiary);
Watkins v. Clemmer, 129 Cal. App. 567, 19 P.2d 303 (1933) (father's oral statement
to his ex-wife to pay for medical services for their son cannot be enforced by doctor).
Section 140 of the Restatement of Contracts is also pertinent here:
There can be no donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary unless a contract has been formed between a promisor and promisee; and if a contract
is conditional, voidable, or unenforceable at the time of its formation, or
subsequently ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impossibility, illegality or the present or prospective failure of the promisee to
perform a return promise which was the consideration for the promisor's
promise, the right of a donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary under the
contract is subject to the same limitation.
Restatement of Contracts § 140 (1932).
161. Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (city has no standing to
object to state granted tax exempt status for railroad property); City of South
Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039 (1980) (city had no standing to contest regional agency's
land use and transportation plans); Aguaryo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) (city had standing to object to welfare program's requirement that recipients receive job training); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973) (city could not
object to state welfare statute). The California courts have also recognized the issue to be that of standing. Community Television of Southern California v.
County of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 3d 990, 119 Cal, Rptr. 276 (1975) (tax agency
lacks standing to object to constitutionality of allowing businesses welfare exemp-

Thus, even if a municipality is barred from bringing a direct action to attack the constitutionality of state deregulatory law, it is
not barred because its substantive rights under the contract remain unabridged. The question is solely that of the municipality's
inability to show standing to assert the claim.
Even considering the problems of standing involved when a
municipality attacks state deregulatory statutes, the rule that a
beneficiary under a third party beneficiary contract can possess
no greater substantive rights than the promisee, assuming the validity of that proposition, has no application. The citizens of a municipality are not claiming a greater substantive right than the
host jurisdiction. The substantive right impaired, that being the
right of local rate setting, is impaired both as to the cities as well
as to their citizens. However, assuming, arguendo, that municipalities cannot assert those rights, the citizens can assert their
own rights against the state.
The notion that a third party beneficiary can possess no greater
rights under a contract than the promisor or promisee is legally
fallacious. Third party beneficiaries to a contract may assert
rights which could not be asserted by a party to the contract. In
Donnellan v. Rocks,162 a contract to purchase real estate imposed
the obligation to pay the broker's commission upon the seller.
When the buyer unlawfully breached the contract, however, the
court permitted the broker to recover his commission from the
buyer on the grounds that the broker was a third party beneficiary of the sales contract. The court had no difficulty with the fact
that the seller could not have recovered the commission from the
broker, thus elevating the third party's rights beyond those of the
original party to the contract.
In Pearsallv. Townsend,16 3 the defendant assumed the debts incurred by a promise made in connection with a subdivision project. In exchange, the promisee conveyed his interest in the
project to the defendant. The court later held that the contract
was negated by fraud. Nevertheless, the plaintiff, a contractor on
the property, was permitted to recover against the defendant as a
third party beneficiary of the contract. The court specifically rejected the theory that the plaintiff could not recover because the
tion to tax liability); Harman v. San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 880 (1972) (citizen taxpayer has standing to object to city's method of selling
its interest in vacant streets).
162. Donnellan v. Rocks, 22 Cal. App. 3d 925, 99 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1972) (buyers obligated to pay broker's commission on breached contract to purchase real estate
even though agreement called for seller to pay had transaction occurred).
163. Pearsall v. Townsend, 7 Cal. App. 2d 162, 45 P.2d 824 (1935) (third party
beneficiary may enforce a contract that has not been rescinded even if it cannot be
enforced by one of parties to agreement because of fraud).
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164
promisee could not have recovered based upon the facts.
These decisions naturally follow from the principle that the promise to a third party beneficiary "is treated as having been made
directly to the third party."1 65 Thus, a defect in the original promisee's position does not inherently destroy the third party beneficiary's rights under the contract. This doctrine is consistent with
the position of the Second Restatement of Contracts.166 Under
the position taken by the Restatement, the lack of standing for
the original promisee is not included among the the defenses
maintainable against the third party beneficiary. Thus, any defi-

ciency in standing of a municipality does not relegate the standing of individual citizens to an inferior status.
V1.

CONCLUSION

Although it has been generally assumed that a state can freely
interfere with the contractual rights of its political subdivisions
164. Id. at 166, 45 P.2d at 826. Accord Griffin v. Williamson, 137 Cal. App. 2d. 308,
290 P.2d 361 (1955) (security holder in property has no claim against subsequently
formed partnership if the partnership contains no express intent to be obligated
for the debt); Silveyra v. Harper, 82 Cal App. 2d 761, 187 P.2d 83 (1947) (beneficiaries' reliance on contract is enforceable even if contract is rescinded before
beneficiary files suit but after his performance).
165. Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal.. App.. 2d 279, 290, 272 P.2d 82, 89 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955) (veterans can sue contractor who agreed with the United
States to build houses complying with certain specifications for sale to veterans
when those specifications are not met). Accord Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle LincolnMercury, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 325 P.2d 193 (1958) (parties injured in a car accident can sue to enforce oral agreement between car dealer and purchaser-driver
that dealer would procure insurance).
166. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts indicates the extent of this
doctrine:
Section 309. Defenses against the beneficiary.
(1) The promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless a contract is
formed between the promisor and promisee; and if a contract is voidable
or unenforceable at the time of its formation the right of any beneficiary is
subject to the infirmity.
(2) If a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impracticability, public policy, non-occurence of a condition, or present or
prospective failure of performance, the right of any beneficiary is to that
extent discharged or modifledL
(3) Except as stated in subsections (1) and (2) and in § 311, or as provided
by the contract, the right of any beneficiary against the promisor is not
subject to the promisor's claims of defenses against the promisee or to the
promisee's claims or defenses against the beneficiary.
(4) A beneficiary's right against the promisor is subject to any claim or
defense arising from his own conduct or agreement.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309 (1979).

under cable television franchises,167 perhaps such a conclusion is
premature. State deregulatory legislation, even adopted with the
best of motives, can be contrary to the best interest of both local
government and its citizens by feeding the ravaging appetites for
profit of monopolistic cable operators. By giving its approval to
regressive legislation such as Goverment Code section 53066.1,
legislatures are choosing profit over human rights by impairing
not only the vested contractual rights of its local subdivisions and
their residents, but also heeding the cable operator's quest for
profits over the individual's ability to communicate and receive
communication with the outside world. The contracts between
cable operators and local governments should be afforded the
same degree of sanctity afforded contracts in business and commercial settings. When a governmental entity, regardless of the
level, enters into a binding contract with a cable operator, it
should be able to have the reasonable expectation that the terms
and conditions of that contract will be honored by the parties
thereto for the term of the contract. The cable operator should
not be able to utilize the political process to circumvent its obligations under the franchise contract or receive benefits of the contract beyond the scope of contractual negotiations or bargains. To
treat cable television franchise contracts as "second class citizens" in the heirarchy of constitutional and contractual law would
be a serious mistake and act as a disservice to cable television
subscribers throughout this country.

167. Barnett, State, Federaland Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAw 684 (1972), wherein it is concluded "IhIence, it appears that a state
government does have legal power, the constitutional provision notwithstanding,
to establish for cable a regulatory scheme unfettered by the terms of existing
franchises . . . ." Id. at 708.

